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THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE IN SCHOOLS
JAMES M. HENDERSON, SR.'
At the American Center for Law and Justice,' we love the Tinker2
case. We frequently grapple with it to bring it into the service of our
clients. Many in our constituency share Provost Hafen's view of children:
although they should become autonomous, well-rounded individuals who
participate fully as citizens in our democracy,3 they do not begin life that
way. Our society wants public schools to provide our children with the
guidance and direction necessary to become fully autonomous and
responsible members of society.
The public has been frustrated here in New York because the citizenry
B.A., Biology, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, 1981; J.D., St. Louis
University School of Law, 1987. Mr. Henderson serves as Senior Counsel in the Washington,
D.C. office of the American Center for Law and Justice.
I Pat Robertson. head of the Christian Broadcasting Network, founded the American Center
for Law and Justice in 1991. The Center is based in Virginia Beach, Virginia, and has 25 lawyers
on staff. The Center's lawyers have won five of the six cases they have argued before the United
States Supreme Court. See Mark Curriden. Defenders of the Faith, 80 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1994. at
86. 89 (listing eight Christian public interest law firms).
2 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker,
school officials suspended 3 public school students for wearing black armbands in protest of the
Vietnam War and the students filed suit. Id. at 504. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa upheld the constitutionality of the school's action on the ground that
the suspension was reasonable to prevent a disturbance of school discipline. See Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d
988 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.
1967). rev'd, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the students'
display was "akin to 'pure speech'" and comprehensively protected under the First Amendment.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06. The Court articulated that students, whether in or out of school. are
"persons" under the Constitution. Id. at 511. The Court. however, concluded that conduct which
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of rights of others is
... not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." Id. at 513. The Court
determined that since the students' display was not of such nature, the suspension was uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 514. For a more detailed discussion of Tinker, see Alexis I. Crow & John W.
Whitehead, Beyond Establishment Clause Analysis in Public School Situations: The Need To
Apply The Public Forum and Tinker Doctrines. 28 TULSA L.J. 149. 188-211 (1992) (discussing
Tinker and arguing it should be preferred method of analysis).
3 See generally Bruce 0. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and
Student Expression in the 1990s, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 379 (1995).
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has suffered certain disadvantages by living in this state. One significant
disability is having suffered through the regime of a New York State
Attorney General, Robert Abrams. Attorney General Abrams' view of the
appropriate role of religion in public life is, frankly, bizarre. Since briefs
to the United States Supreme Court are generally written with some care
and precision,4 it is fair to presume that Attorney General Abrams meant
what he said in his brief in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District.' Attorney General Abrams explained New York's
justification for treating church applications to use public schools differently
from requests by other civic and social groups by asserting, "[r]eligious
advocacy . . . serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents and
yields a benefit only to those who already believe."6
The Lamb's Chapel case, of course, is about community access to
school facilities after school hours, not a student's right to free speech at
those facilities.7 I know we are here to talk about Tinker. The notion,
4 See generally, STERN ET AL. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 543-76 (6th ed. 1986) (detailing
method of brief writing to Supreme Court).
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
6 Brief for Respondent Attorney General at 24, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (No. 91-2024). In Lamb's Chapel. an evangelical church
claimed the school district violated its constitutional rights when the district rejected the church's
request to use school facilities after school hours to show a film series addressing contemporary
family problems from a religious viewpoint. Id. at 2144-45. Under state law and school district
policy, school facilities were made available after school hours for a variety of specified purposes.
none of which were specifically related to religious uses. Id. In addition to these specified uses.
the law and policy permitted the use of the facilities for community purposes. Id. In order to
justify the denial of Lamb's Chapel's request, therefore, the Attorney General surprisingly argued
that religion does not serve the community.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia characterized the New York Attorney General's
view of the First Amendment as "strange" and stated that it was a "strange notion ... that a
Constitution which itself gives 'religion in general' preferential treatment (I refer to the Free
Exercise Clause) forbids the endorsement of religion in general." Id. at 2151 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia further articulated that those who adopted the Constitution believed that
the public virtues encouraged by religion benefited the public at large. See id.: see also Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (stating that U.S. Constitution "affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance of all religions").
I In Lamb's Chapel, the Supreme Court concluded that the school district's refusal to grant
the church access to school facilities solely because it sought to display a film series with a
distinctly Christian perspective violated the church's First Amendment right to free speech.
Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147. The Court reasoned that since the school district had opened
school facilities to private organizations who used the property for purposes similar to those of
the Lamb's Chapel. the church was denied access "solely because the film dealt with the subject
from a religious standpoint." Id. Additionally, the Court held that the church's use of school
facilities did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2148. The Establishment Clause
remained uninfringed because the "film would not have been [shown] during school hours, would
not have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not just to
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however, that religion and religious groups have little to offer the
community as a whole is bizarre. Those of us who were children of the
television generation certainly can recall the frequent suggestion, during
Saturday morning cartoons, to attend a House of Worship each weekend.
This suggestion came in the form of public service announcements
sponsored by groups such as Religion in Public Life and the Advertising
Council.
Tinker has remained a bulwark in our legal representation of our
student clientele. At the American Center for Law and Justice, we
frequently invoke the case in service of student religious activities and cite
it in our briefs as though it were good law. I believe Tinker remains good
law simply because the Supreme Court has not shown the intellectual
candor to overrule it. Unfortunately, however, it appears that Tinker is
being supplanted in the lower courts by other standards.' Furthermore,
those courts are not following the Supreme Court's attenuations of Tinker
in either Bethel School District v. Fraser9 or Hazelwood School District v.
church members." Id. To support this conclusion, the Court pointed to its prior decision in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263. 275 (1981), where it held that the interest of the state in
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation might compel the abridgement of speech otherwise
protected by the First Amendment, but only if there was a realistic danger that the community
might think the government was endorsing religion. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 271-72. As it
did in Widmar, the Court in Lamb's Chapel held there was no realistic danger of the community
perceiving government endorsement of religion if the school district opened its facilities to the
church. Id. at 2148.
1 For cases declining to incorporate the Tinker rationale and, instead, following a public
forum analysis approach in student speech cases, see Brody v. Spang. 957 F.2d 1108. 1117-22
(3d Cir. 1992) (applying public forum test to Establishment Clause challenge where inclusion of
religious benedictions and invocations at graduation ceremonies were at issue): Planned
Parenthood of S. Nevada, Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 822-28 (9th Cir. 1991)
(applying public forum analysis to high school educator's decision to reject family-planning
advertisements in school publications): San Diego Comm. Against Registration and the Draft v.
Governing Bd. of the Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist.. 790 F.2d 1471, 1474-78 (9th Cir. 1986)
(using public forum analysis in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights challenge to rejection of anti-draft
advertisement in school newspaper). For cases applying both the public forum analysis and
Establishment Clause analysis, see Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608, 613 (9th
Cir. 1989) (applying not only Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier. 484 U.S. 260. 273 (1988)
public forum analysis but also Establishment Clause to uphold public school's denial of student
religious group to meet on campus), vacated and cert. granted, 465 U.S. 914 (1990): Collins v.
Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759. 763 (9th Cir.) ("[Wv]hen the explicit Establishment
Clause proscription against prayer in the public schools is considered, the protections of political
and religious speech are inapposite." (quoting Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971. 980
(2d Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981).
9 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (concluding that suspension of student for use of lewd and sexually
explicit speech during school assembly did not violate student's First Amendment right of free
speech).
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Kuhlmeier. °  In my opinion, the principal danger to First Amendment
rights specifically recognized and granted by Tinker is the application of the
public forum doctrine in the school setting. " This doctrine is used to
resolve requests to use public property for purposes of free speech.
In its fundamental motif, the public forum doctrine first separates
'0 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that school officials did not violate student's right to
free speech by exercising editorial control over form and substance of student speech in school
sponsored expressive activities "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns").
" The public forum doctrine originated in the 1930s out of the i[C]ourt's efforts to address
the recurring and troublesome issue of when the First Amendment gives an individual or group
the right to engage in expressive activity on government property." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund. Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 815 (1985) (explaining public forum analysis and
corresponding standards of scrutiny). In Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org.. 307 U.S. 496
(1939). the Supreme Court recognized that "streets and parks. . . have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind. have been used for purposes of assembly.
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Id. at 515. Neverthe-
less, a person only has the privilege to use the public streets and parks for speech purposes and
therefore the government can regulate it. Id. at 516. "lIt is not absolute, but relative, and must
be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with
peace and good order, but it must not, in the guise of regulation. be abridged or denied." Id. In
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). the Supreme Court
identified the following two distinct types of public fora when reviewing governmental limitations
on public access to public property: (1) traditional areas of public assembly and debate: and (2)
limited public forums-public property which the government has opened to the public for
expressive activity. Id. at 45. The first category includes public streets and parks. Cornelius. 473
U.S. at 802. "In these quintessential public for[a]," the content-based regulation of speech will
be upheld if it is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end." Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. A regulation that merely limits the time.
place, and manner of the speech in a content-neutral fashion will be upheld if it is "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication." Id.
Public property classified as a limited public forum is governed by the same standards
applied to a traditional public forum. Id. at 46. A number of factors, however, must be evaluated
to determine when public property is a limited public forum. These factors include "policy and
practice of the government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally
open to assembly and debate as a public forum . . . the nature of the property and its
compatibility with expressive activity to discern the government's intent." Cornelius. 473 U.S.
at 802. The courts utilize these factors when they consider whether particular school facilities are
public fora. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
With respect to free speech in schools, commentators have suggested that the public forum
doctrine is more restrictive than the Tinker approach. See, e.g.. Crow & Whitehead, supra note
2, at 211 (suggesting that Tinker analysis is less intrusive and more in keeping with notion of
school as marketplace of ideas); Rosemary C. Salamone. Public Forum Doctrine and the Perils
of Categorical Thinking: Lessons from Lamb's Chapel, 24 N.M. L. REV. 1.24 (1994) (contend-
ing that formalistic forum analysis is flawed and would benefit from principles of Tinker
approach). But see James C. Dever, III, Note, Tinker Revisited: Fraser v. Bethel School District
and Regulation of Speech in the Public Schools, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1164. 1193 (submitting that
Tinker approach is actually same as public forum analysis).
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claims to eliminate those that do no involve a claim of state encroachment
on the right to freedom of speech. Then, where pure speech or expressive
conduct are threatened by governmental action, it is necessary to "identify
the nature of the forum because the extent to which the Government may
limit access depends on whether the forum is public or nonpublic."' 2
Forum classification is critical. As one United States circuit court of
appeals noted, "[t]he nature of the forum, as either public or non-public,
determines the standards courts must apply in reviewing the propriety of
state action infringing upon speech or expressive conduct."' 3  Once a
court determines the type of forum and its corresponding standard of
review, the court must decide whether the asserted justifications for the
exclusion of expressive activity satisfy the relevant standard. 14
The public forum doctrine is nearly adequate as a template for the
resolution of issues related to the right to have access to the public's eyes
and ears. In its essence, the doctrine counsels governmental restraint in
those places where exercises of free speech rights are expected, such as
streets, sidewalks, and parks. 5 Any government action which attempts
to limit speech in these areas will be scrutinized closely by the courts. ' 6
12 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797.
'3 Naturist Soc'y., Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1521 (11th Cir. 1992).
14 See Cornelius. 473 U.S. at 797.
". See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2716-17
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "[p]ublic places are of necessity the locus for
discussion of public issues, as well as to protect against arbitrary government action .... The
types of property we have recognized as the quintessential public forums are streets, parks,
and sidewalks"), PerrEduc. Ass'n. 460 U.S. at 45 ("At one end of the spectrum are streets and
parks which 'have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public . . . .") (quoting
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515). Additionally, this restraint is advocated for governmentally-owned
properties that lack a traditional use for expressive purposes by the public, but have been opened
deliberately for such uses. See Pery Educ. Ass'n. 480 U.S. at 37-38.
16 In public forums such as parks and streets, the state may enforce a content-based regulation
on speech only if it satisfies a strict scrutiny test: the regulation is necessary to a compelling
state interest and it is narrowly tailored to achieve this interest. See, e.g., Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129-36 (1992) (declaring unconstitutional county ordinance
that based fee required for parade permit upon administrator's assessment of possible hostility
relating to speech, and where statute was not narrowly construed to further state's interests):
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191. 196-211 (1992) (subjecting content-based restriction on elec-
tioneering within 100 feet of entrance to polling place to strict scrutiny analysis and concluding
that compelling state interest justified restriction): Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312. 321-29 (1988)
(determining that statute prohibiting display of any political sign within 500 feet of foreign
embassy was unconstitutional because it was content-based restriction on political speech and was
not narrowly tailored); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 464-67 (1980) (concluding that Illinois
statute which generally prohibits residential picketing, but exempts peaceful labor dispute
picketing, violated Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment because statute
discriminated based on content of communication and was not narrowly tailored to serve
1995]
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The public forum doctrine also provides a framework for reviewing
restrictions on places that are not associated with freedom of speech, such
as jailhouses, post office property, and military bases.' 7 In such places,
we are not accustomed to observing the right to expressive freedom.
Consequently, the standards provided by the doctrine for review of
governmental action in these nonpublic forums afford greater discretion to
regulatory authorities.' 8
Lower standards of scrutiny will be applied to governmental
restrictions on student speech activities where one applies the public forum
doctrine rather than Tinker and its progeny. The difficulty of proving a
traditional association use of various school venues for expressive activities
will bring about diminished scrutiny because the Supreme Court appears to
favor this type of record in these cases. Instead, courts will address
students' speech rights in a piecemeal fashion to decide whether a particular
hallway, meeting room, or lawn has commonly been viewed as "open"
based on the facts of a particular case. 19
substantial state interest in protecting citizens' privacy). A state, however, will be given more
latitude to regulate speech in a content-neutral manner provided the restrictions are confined to
a significant government interest and they leave open ample alternative channels for communica-
tion of the information. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys.. Inc. v. FCC. 114 S. Ct. 2445.
2459-67 (1994) (declaring Congressional act requiring cable companies to carry local commercial
and public broadcasting constitutional because act is content-neutral and therefore not subject to
strict scrutiny test, and because statute only creates incidental burden on speech): Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-803 (1989) (upholding New York City's content-neutral
regulation of music volume played at Central Park bandshell as serving government's interest and
finding regulation justified if city's interest would be achieved less effectively absent regulation):
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.. 475 U.S. 41,50 (1986) (finding that zoning ordinance
that prohibited adult theaters within 1000 feet of any residential zone, church, park, or school was
constitutional provided governmental regulation served purposes unrelated to content of
expression and allows for "reasonable alternative avenues of communication"): Heffron v.
International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness. 452 U.S. 640. 649-55 (1981) (upholding
regulation of solicitation on Minnesota State Fairgrounds where regulation was content-neutral,
legitimate state interest in maintaining orderly crowd movement existed, and alternative channels
for communication were available).
"7 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-30 (1990) (holding that postal
service regulation prohibiting certain type of speech did not violate constitutional protections since
postal sidewalk was not considered traditional public forum) (plurality opinion): Greer v. Spock.
424 U.S. 828, 836-38 (1976) (concluding that government may regulate speech on military
installations because bases are not traditional public forums): Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39.
41-42 (1966) (determining that jailhouse grounds do not constitute public forum).
IS See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788. 806 (1985)
('Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity
provided the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and
are viewpoint neutral.").
"9 See, e.g., Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Directors,
776 F.2d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1985) (determining that athletic field did not become limited public
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The public forum doctrine is very effective in protecting speakers in
traditional public arenas. Thus, a pamphleteer need not prove that other
speakers regularly have used the sidewalk along 42nd Street to invoke
public forum analysis successfully. The Supreme Court, however, has
articulated that it is seldom willing to interpret an occasional action or lapse
by a government authority as a creation of a permanent public forum.2'
As a result, students' protections are limited and Tinker is diminished to the
point of disappearance.
One of our chief interests at the American Center for Law and Justice,
is the confluence of religion and public schools. I submit that this
confluence assures that religious speech activities will continue to provide
ample fodder for school controversies, just as race and gender relations will
continue to be disputed issues. Although some may naively challenge that
prediction, it is based on obvious precedent. Remember that the children
in Tinker were the children of a minister employed by a religious
organization. Although the Tinkers' black armbands appeared to us to be
a form of political speech, they were undoubtedly as much an expression
of religious views as they were a way to express opposition to the Vietnam
War.
Today, school officials can only feign surprise when they observe
students wearing black armbands to express political views or religious
beliefs. Thus, I find perplexing the predictable chain of events that erupts
when a student wears a T-shirt bearing a religious message to school.
forum for purposes of regulating political speech where previous practice of permitting public
access to field did not change its primary function); Gittes v. Torgeisen, No. 92-0933-R. 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8502 (W.D. Va. Jan. 31, 1995) (determining that university's campus drill
field remained non-public forum); Hemry v. School Bd. of Colorado Springs Sch. Dist. No. 11.
760 F. Supp. 856, 863 (D.Colo. 1991) (finding that no evidence supported conclusion that high
school's hallways were open public fora for use by general public), Nelson v. Moline Sch. Dist.
No. 40, 725 F. Supp. 965, 973-74 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that hallways were not public forums
when school had never opened hallways for public use).
I See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 ("The government does not create a public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional
forum for public discourse."). School facilities may be deemed public forums only if school
authorities have, by policy or by practice, opened those facilities for -indiscriminate use by the
general public." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37. 47 (1983).
The state is not required to maintain indefinitely the facility as an open public forum, however,
for the time that it does, the state must maintain the same standards as apply in a traditional
public forum. See id. at 46; see also supra note 8 (providing standjards that apply to these
forums). School officials may impose reasonable restrictions on speech in the school community
when the facilities have been reserved for non-school purposes. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988); see also Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 ('[R]egulation of
speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activity
is examined only for reasonableness.").
19951
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School officials and courts must realize that there are many students who
attend public schools who are "true believers," whether they are Evangeli-
cal Christians, Orthodox Jews, or Islamic Fundamentalists. These children
are entitled to attend public schools and be religious. These students
should not be coerced to abandon their spirituality in order to receive the
benefit of public education. Consequently, conflicts arising from religious
activities and speech will continue to be fuel for school controversy.
Since Tinker lies in a state of disuse, we rely more frequently on the
Supreme Court decision in Westside Community Schools v. Mergens2' to
resolve these controversies. In Mergens, the Supreme Court rejected a
facial challenge to the Equal Access Act," holding that the Act did not
violate the Establishment Clause,' and that a school district violated the
Act when it refused to allow a student religious group to form and meet on
campus.24 Two key points emerge from Mergens. First, schools do not
endorse everything that they allow students to say. Second, those students
covered by the Equal Access Act are capable of distinguishing between
government-sponsored speech endorsing religion and private speech
endorsing religion.' The former is prohibited by the Establishment
Clause; 26 the latter enjoys the protection of both the Free Exercise27 and
21 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality opinion).
20 U.S.C. § 40710 (1992). This section provides in part that:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical.
or other content of the speech of such meetings.
Id.
I Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247-53.
24 Id.
Id. at 250.
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has said that the Establishment Clause
prohibits the government from creating an official church, influencing others to believe or not to
believe in a certain church, punishing citizens for their religious beliefs, and preferring one
religion over another. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
In Mergens, students sought permission from school officials to form a Christian club at the
school. The purpose of this organization was to read and discuss the Bible, to have fellowship.
and to meet and pray together. Mergens. 496 U.S. at 232. Any student would be able to join this
club, regardless of religious affiliation. Id. In fact, the organization would have the same rights
as the school's secular clubs except the religious club would not have a faculty advisor. Id. The
school district rejected the proposal because of the requirement that a student club have a faculty
sponsor and because they believed the existence of a religious club at the school violated the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 232-33. The Court found that the school maintained a limited open
forum under the Equal Access Act and was prohibited from discriminating against students who
wanted to meet on school premises to discuss religious issues during non-class hours. Id. at 246-
47. Furthermore, the Court decided that the school district's recognition of this student group
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free speech clauses.2 The decline of Tinker is regrettable; and although
we continually choose to represent it as good law in practice, the American
Center for Law and Justice relies more and more on Mergens and other
lower court decisions.
would not violate the Establishment Clause. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248. In noting that the
Constitution protects private speech endorsing religion, the Court found students would not
misconstrue the existence of the club as school support of religious activity. Id. at 250. The Court
concluded by stating that the Equal Access Act did not -on its face contravene the Establishment
Clause." Id. at 253.
' U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.").
1 Id.
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